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resumen
El Partido de los Trabajadores (PT) desarrolló en Porto Alegre un régimen participativo de gasto, que 
permitió a los ciudadanos tener una voz sobre la inversión pública a nivel municipal. Éste ha sido aclamado 
como un modelo de participación en la toma de decisiones que aumenta la transparencia al nivel local. 
La mayoría de los académicos han mirado este régimen con un enfoque socio-céntrico, enfocándose en 
los encuentros participativos, y en el rol de la sociedad civil. Sin embargo, poca atención ha sido dada al 
diseño institucional, el rol crucial de la administración pública, y a los políticos del PT responsables de las 
mejoras en el servicio público y la infraestructura.
Este artículo tiene un enfoque de políticas y redirige la atención hacia los funcionarios y políticos que 
estuvieron firmemente en el control y llevaron las riendas del régimen. La principal propuesta del artículo 
es que gran parte del éxito de la administración del PT en Porto Alegre dependió de dedicados militantes 
nombrados dentro de la administración municipal. Ellos fueron la encarnación del presupuesto participativo 
intermediado, el que fue un importante instrumento para la participación ciudadana, pero que contaba con 
una serie de debilidades estructurales, que los militantes del PT fueron capaces de superar durante varios 
años.
Palabras Claves: Democracia Participativa, Presupuesto Participativo, Formulación de Políticas, 
Brasil
Abstract
 The Workers’ Party (PT) developed In Porto Alegre a participatory expenditure scheme which 
allowed citizens to have a say on public investments at municipal level. It has been hailed as a model 
for participatory decision-making that increases transparency at the local level. Most scholars so far have 
looked at this scheme with a society-centred approach focusing on the participatory meetings and the 
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role of civil society. However, little attention has been given to the institutional design, the crucial role of 
the public administration, and PT politicians who were responsible for the increase in public services and 
infrastructure.
 This article has a policy approach and redirects the attention toward officials and politicians who 
were firmly in control and pulled the strings of the scheme. The article’s main contention is that much of 
the success of the PT administration in Porto Alegre hinged upon dedicated partisan members appointed 
inside the municipal administration. They were the embodiment of the intermediary participatory budget 
as such was an important instrument for citizens’ inclusion, but lacked the showed a number of structural 
weaknesses which these militant PT members were able to overcome during many years.  
Keywords: Participatory Democracy, Participatory Budgeting, Policy-Making, Brazil
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1.  Introduction 
Since the 1980s a decentralisation process has been underway in Latin America which has 
resulted in an increasing transfer of responsibilities and, in a lesser degree, resources from the 
central to the local level. At the same time, peoples’ confidence in politics has never been as low 
in Latin America as in recent years (UNDP, 2004). The call for the empowerment of citizenship 
by civil society movements in many Latin American countries is emblematic for the failure of 
state institutions to successfully address problems such as high levels of poverty, inequality, and 
corruption. In the debate about ways of revitalizing democracy and increase accountability of the 
public administration, new forms of citizens’ participation at the local level have been propagated 
ranging from mere consultations in referendums to inclusive deliberative processes in which 
citizens actively participate. 
This debate has deeply been influenced by the experience of the Participatory Budgeting (PB) 
in Porto Alegre, Brazil. The Brazilian Workers’ Party PT elaborated the model in this municipality 
between 1989 until 2005 when it held the city’s mayoralty during four consecutive mandates. 
The PB model is now internationally renowned as a best practice of innovative participatory 
democracy by several bodies of the United Nations. Meanwhile, it has been adopted in one 
way or another in hundreds of municipalities in Latin America and elsewhere (Cabannes, 2004). 
There is a broad consensus among analysts in recognising the success of this scheme in Porto 
Alegre and stressing its positive effects for the redistribution of resources to poor neighbourhoods, 
improved public services, and budget transparency (see Abers, 2000; Baiocchi, 2001; Fedozzi, 
1997; Navarro, 2003). 
Multilateral institutions and national governments are increasingly interested in participatory 
mechanisms as part of a discourse clustered around public management concepts of ‘good 
governance’ and ‘public-private partnerships’. From that perspective citizens’ participation is 
viewed as a way of increasing governmental accountability and transparency in public affairs 
in combination with budget austerity (World Bank, 2005; IADB, 1997). In Latin America, 
participatory mechanisms are considered a counterweight for the high levels of corruption in 
politics, clientelism, and social inequality. Traditionally state and society in Latin America are two 
spheres marked by tension, distrust, and miscommunication (Chalmers et. al., 1997). 
Different political approaches have been suggested to deal with this issue. At one side of the 
spectrum is the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm which has in the wake of neo-liberal 
theory introduced market mechanisms, and notions of accountability and transparency into the 
realm of the public administration in order to reach goals of good governance. An efficient and 
entrepreneurial government should take more policy decisions (steering capacity of the state) 
and do less service delivery (rowing capacity of the state)(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). This 
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NPM approach emphasises administrative decentralisation, public-private partnerships, and 
entrepreneurial systems in which communities are involved. In this NPM framework participatory 
mechanisms remain encapsulated in a technocratic conception and citizens’ participation 
becomes a planning instrument to reach efficient allocation of public resources and accountability. 
In public procedures technical criteria prescribed by the administration predominate, while 
popular participation is marginally allowed and consultative without real decision-making power. 
The NPM approach contrasts with notions of deliberative democracy stressing the 
reciprocity and dialogue between state and society and resulting in a government by consent 
(Hirst, 1994). Civil society theory approaches the state-society interface with special attention 
for the predominance of civil society in the public sphere. Proponents call for opening the black 
box of secretive political and administrative procedures of the budgetary process in order to 
gain transparency and accountability. Authors such as Avritzer (2002) stress the importance of 
the public sphere and identify a plural space which is self-regulated, critical, and horizontally 
interlinked. This neo-Tocquevillian society-centred approach emphasises alleged autonomy and 
agency of grassroots movements and downplays the importance of policy-makers and public 
authorities who design and facilitate the process. As a result, the civil society-centred literature 
has developed a normative bias against bureaucratic mechanisms and public administration in 
general.
Authors such as Abers (2003), Keck and Abers (2006), Mohan and Stokke (2003), and Nylen 
(2003) have correctly observed that the civil society paradigm downgrades the importance of 
underlying political strategies and agendas to transfer power to popular forums and largely ignore 
the reactions of the bureaucracy to its loss of power. It is our assumption that the performance of 
the PT administration has been a more decisive factor than the increased citizen participation in 
offering better basic services in Porto Alegre. 
In line with this last viewpoint, this article aims to contextualise the participatory budgeting 
in Porto Alegre from a policy perspective, assessing the contribution of the PT administration 
to the successful outcome. For this purpose three basic dimensions of public management 
will be addressed, i.e. budgeting and financing, the organisation of the administration, and its 
relationship with civil society. This study will identify the crucial role played by a specific group of 
municipal officials in Porto Alegre in designing, coordinating, and implementing the participatory 
mechanism This moves the spotlight toward these intermediaries in the municipal administration 
who have largely remained in the dark because most of the academic research has focused on 
the active role of civil society organisations. This article will prove that the so called “popular 
administration” and its participatory mechanism hinged upon the expert knowledge of these 
intermediary officials, although not in a traditional technocratic way but as an asset to improve 
the communication between policy makers and citizens. 
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This study is based on fieldwork conducted in Porto Alegre in several stages between 2004 
and 2007 with the support of the Dutch Research Fund (NWO). The timing was important, 
because the PT lost the municipal elections in 2004 and many of the militant officials lost their 
position and were free to talk in hindsight about their experiences in the PT administration. The 
majority of the interviewees were rank-and-file PT militants who worked as appointed officials 
in the PT administration. Many of the comments were critical assessments of the participatory 
budget and attempt to explain the electoral loss of the PT. The date collection was finalised with a 
workshop on citizens’ participation and public policies which was organised by Leiden University 
and the University of Rio Grande do Sul in Porto Alegre in May 2006.
2.  The participatory budgeting scheme
Participatory budgeting as conceived in Porto Alegre is basically a public expenditure 
scheme in which citizens can decide the priorities for the annual municipal investments about 
public goods such as road building, sewerage, health care, public transport, and education. 
The scheme is based on a number of neighbourhood assemblies in which citizens can vote for 
investment priorities in their neighbourhood and elect representatives who negotiate with the city 
government the annual investment plan. The investment plan consists of concrete projects that 
materialise citizens’ priorities and is presented to the city council for final approval. The executive 
branch implements the projects and is accountable for their realisation. 
Participatory budgeting is a pyramidal system with a central budget council of elected 
members (COP) at the top and regional and thematic assemblies and forums at the base. The 
involvement of individual citizens marks an element of direct democracy, which operates parallel 
to the institutions of the representative system of the elected city council. During the 16 years the 
participatory scheme functioned in Porto Alegre, the amount of money that people could decide 
upon oscillated between ten and fifteen percent of the municipal budget and equalled the city’s 
entire investment resources1. 
There is almost unanimity about the improved municipal services during the sixteen years that 
the PT governed the city. Large progress was made especially in the poorer neighbourhoods in 
improving public infrastructure and services such garbage collection, road pavement, sewerage, 
drinking water and public transport. Participatory budgeting excelled in Porto Alegre has 
worldwide been acknowledged as an innovative policy mechanism that increases transparency 
1  In 2003 the investment budget discussed in the participatory budget rounds was 12 percent of Porto Alegre’s mu-
nicipal budget, representing R$ 87 million (US$ 40 million), the rest consisted of salaries and fixed costs (Plano de 
investimento, 2003).
24        ESTADO, GOBIERNO, GESTIÓN PÚBLICA     Revista Chilena de Administración Pública Nº 12 Diciembre 2008
and accountability. However, many publications on Porto Alegre engage in political advocacy 
advocates and idealise the model as an instrument for political inclusion of the poor and even 
for deepening democracy. The sheer number of publications about Porto Alegre gives even 
the impression of a city in a permanent state of euphoria about direct democracy engendering 
a ‘participatory fever’ under the population which allegedly deepened democracy (Navarro, 
2003). 
Some critical remarks on these claims are here presented. Firstly, the evidence draws 
on examples from single sectors such as increased number of paved roads and extended 
sewage systems, and is mainly anecdotal and localised, and lacks a control group to make 
scientific conclusions. Therefore, Robinson (2003) argues that there exists very little systematic 
or comparative evidence worldwide whether increased citizens’ participation generates better 
outputs in terms of public services. Revealing in this respect is that the neighbouring city of 
Curitiba scored better than Porto Alegre in fighting its housing deficit, while this city was governed 
by an administration clinging to a NPM policy model marked by a top-down approach and 
technocratic planning2. The Curitiba case suggests that a municipalities in southern Brazil can 
also obtain tangible results with a completely different policy approach and, consequently, that 
the participatory model is not per se the decisive variable to explain Porto Alegre’s successful 
achievements in public investment. Secondly, the alleged massive character and its democratic 
level are dubious, because the numbers of participants oscillated around 12,000 participants 
per year which represented just one percent of the population of Porto Alegre. People from 
poorer city districts were overrepresented under the participants and this tiny fraction of the 
population decided the city’s annual investment budget and bypassed the democratically elected 
city’s council. Thirdly, the claim of ‘deepened democracy in Porto Alegre’ is difficult to assess. 
Civic organisations and individuals were primarily concerned about securing public investments 
in their neighbourhood, and a discussion about deepening democracy or a new institutional 
design was not a broadly discussed issue (Fedozzi, 2001). The only proven trend was a gradual 
evolution in demands in the course of the years. In the first two mandates citizens voted for 
basic infrastructure such as road pavement and sanitation and subsequently social issues such 
as health care, education, and housing programmes became priorities. The practical demands 
became gradually more sophisticated requiring more organisational capacity and expertise from 
the bureaucracy. 
2 Curitiba is the capital of Porto Alegre’s neighbouring state of Paraná and is worldwide hailed as an ecological city 
with an exemplary public transport system and waste recycling program (Hawken et al., 2000). 
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3.  Political commitment for a new policy approach
In 1989, the PT was determined to put an end to the clientelist tradition of Porto Alegre’s 
previous administrations marked by favouritism, corruption and ill-spending of public funding up 
to a level that the poor in peripheral areas were largely deprived from infrastructure investment. 
The PT replaced it with a participatory scheme accessible for all citizens who frequented the 
plenary assemblies in their neighbourhood. A major innovation was that every citizen’s demand 
had to go through the same decision-making procedure of the new budget scheme, which 
blocked the possibility of the previous system marked by personal privileges and clientelism. 
Another policy goal was to open up the black box of the municipal budget to increase the 
transparency in order to make politicians and civil servants accountable. Therefore, the PT stick 
to the principle that the participatory budget was the only channel for municipal investments 
and no other secretive budget allocation could take place. The administration also stimulated 
and increased the information flow toward the participants during the budget scheme in order to 
enable citizens to scrutinise municipal accounts and procedures (Baiocchi, 2003). Consequently, 
the typical asymmetric access to information and knowledge between state authorities and civil 
society was lowered and this enabled citizens to participate in the decision-making process. 
The PT countered the social marginalisation and inequality by applying the principle of ‘the 
inversion of policy priorities’ to obtain a redistributive effect that favoured infrastructure works in 
poor neighbourhoods. The annual investment plans during the PT administration indicate that 
roughly 80 percent of the investments went to the city’s poorer districts. As a result, the city 
of Porto Alegre dramatically improved its basic indicators of sanitation, street pavement, and 
school enrolments, especially in the poor neighbourhoods. Although this correlation does not 
imply causation, there is a general consensus that the PT’s participatory scheme has contributed 
significantly in achieving these results (Abers, 2000). 
Political manoeuvring was also part of the explanation for implementing a participatory 
budget. In Porto Alegre consecutive PT mayors were confronted with a majority opposition in 
the city council which had the power to reject the city’s budget proposed by the mayor. By letting 
the citizens to decide about the investment budget, the PT mayors obtained popular support 
and increased legitimacy for his budget. The pressure was so effective that the city council, 
controlled by a majority of opposition parties criticising the participatory budget, never rejected 
the proposed budget during the sixteen years it had the opportunity. As such, the list of approved 
projects became a fait accompli for the councillors of the opposition, who considered the political 
cost of disrespecting the will of the citizens too high. 
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4.  Street-level officials
It is our contention that the success of the PT administration and the participatory budget 
should be assessed in the light of the work done by the appointed officials - cargos em comissão 
(CCs), who were the driving force of the popular administration. Directly after obtaining the 
mayoralty in 1990, the PT recruited 600 of its most militant and dedicated members as CCs, 
representing ten percent of the total PT party members in the city (Baierle, 2002). It is a general 
administrative practice in Brazil that newly elected politicians appoint their own partisan members, 
a phenomenon closely linked to Brazil’s problem of politisation of the state bureaucracy and 
political nepotism (Santos, 2002). Yet, in Porto Alegre these CCs were the driving force behind 
the functioning of the administration and worked as ‘liaisons officers’ between the bureaucratic 
departments and the popular assemblies. They established communication channels for all the 
actors in the participatory process, informed the administration about citizen necessities and 
demands, and ironed out differences between demands from the neighbourhood communities 
and municipal officials. 
These category of militant officials in Porto Alegre has similarities with Lipsky’s (1980) 
‘street-level bureaucrats’, but the denomination of ‘bureaucrats’ would not be appropriate for 
them, because the CCs mastered a client-oriented approach with as little bureaucratic rules as 
possible. They should rather be characterised as ‘militant street-level officials’ and the distinction 
with ordinary bureaucrats was twofold. Firstly, they possessed a rare talent to communicate with 
low-educated and mainly poor citizens and established trust and a working relationship which 
are normally uncommon between citizens and public authorities. These skills were due to their 
past activity as PT militants and their familiarity with the needs in the poor neighbourhoods. 
Secondly, the CCs had a clear ideological commitment and an eagerness to improve their city 
after their party won the mayoralty. They combined eagerness to overcome the complex co-
ordination related to grassroots politics with a willingness to attend meetings in poor districts 
during evenings and weekends. The work of the CC was not a regular nine-to-five job, it was 
dedication, and implied 24 hours availability – especially the CCs of the first hour were workhorses 
with love for the party. 
These militant PT members moved from the sphere of grassroots opposition to positions in 
the municipal administration after the PT gained the mayoralty. This was, on the one hand, a 
huge gain for the budget scheme because it offered the much needed citizen collaboration and 
community workers familiar with the situation in the neighbourhoods (see Dryzek, 1996). On 
the other hand, it became gradually a drawback because this co-optation squeezed the best 
community workers out of the ranks of the civic organisations. Navarro (2003) characterised 
it as a new form of clientelism of the PT party which narrowed the PT base of citizens in the 
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neighbourhoods. During the third and fourth PT mandate, large part of the initial community 
leadership was co-opted as a municipal official or encapsulated in the decision bodies of the 
participatory structure resulting in a decline of the PT grassroots structure in the neighbourhoods. 
It was one of the reasons why the participatory scheme grinded to a halt during the fourth mandate 
and lost much of its initial dynamism3. 
4.1 CCs inside the municipal bureaucracy
Back in 1990 the participatory approach of the PT implied drastic changes of administrative 
procedures and required a different mindset from typical Brazilian bureaucrats accustomed to a 
rigid hierarchy without accountability or transparency toward the public. It was a huge challenge 
to bring about a shift from a techno-bureaucracy to a techno-democracy. Very little of the induced 
flexibility really permeated the existing municipal bureaucracy during the years that the PT was in 
power. The majority of the rank-and-file officials showed indifference toward the PT ideology and 
the participatory scheme, while criticism and passive resistance came from the technical experts, 
who reacted against their loss of control (Baierle, 2005; Bairros, 2003).  
Yet the PT did manage to make inroads in the traditional bureaucratic system by appointing a 
group of CCs at middle and high levels in each municipal department to organise and coordinate 
the formulation and implementation of investment projects in close deliberation with the 
participatory structure. These CCs pushed forward and greased the bureaucratic machinery and 
their presence established a new administrative and coordinating mechanism grafted upon the 
old bureaucratic mechanism. It resulted in a division of labour between civil servants (funcionários 
de carreira) who were in charge of the technicalities and the CCs appointed by the mayor and 
who administered and coordinated the administrative performance, and were responsible for the 
external communication toward citizens within the participatory budget structure4.
Another group of CCs working in the departments communicated directly with the people in 
the neighbourhoods where the projects were implemented. Throughout the years, these CCs 
became crucial antennas at grassroots level detecting citizens’ demands and complaints, and 
communicated them to the respective municipal departments. They also supplied concerned 
citizens information from inside the municipal bureaucracy. The pressure was high because the 
bureaucratic procedures were cumbersome and people wanted immediate results and asked 
the CCs to ‘fix things’. “When the project implementation went well, the departments took all the 
credits, when things were delayed everyone blamed the CCs”5.
3  Antonio Sanzi, commercial consultant DMAE.
4  Guillermo Barbosa, director of DMAE 1989-1992.
5  Angela Comunal, community consultant of DEMHAB.
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The category of CCs in Porto Alegre also resembles Grindle’s (1977) profile of the political 
brokers in the Mexican bureaucracy because both groups acted as intermediaries linking 
communities to the municipal authorities. The big difference, however, is that the CCs in Porto 
Alegre only facilitated citizens’ inclusion without offering personal favours and had a militant 
progressive left-wing commitment, whereas in Mexico the brokers were an essential part of an 
extended clientelist network of the PRI party based on personal favours and rent-seeking. 
4.2  CCs monitoring the participatory scheme 
A group of CCs was responsible for the organisation of the participatory meetings in the 
neighbourhoods. Most CCs had built up experience as community leaders or PT activists in their 
neighbourhood and became municipal officials responsible for facilitating the participatory cycle 
in particular neighbourhoods. There was a principle of transfer of CCs to other neighbourhoods 
than the ones they emerged from in order to avoid role conflicts and favouritism. They attended 
meetings to seek compromises, reducing conflicts, and maintaining subtle balances between 
different factions of each neighbourhood. They were responsible for instigating plenary 
assemblies and negotiations in unorganised neighbourhoods, advising community leaders, 
stimulating consensus building, and establishing a network of consultation and deliberation at 
each level of the participatory cycle (Abers, 2003; Barrios, 2003).
CCs had also controlling responsibilities next to the above mentioned supporting activities. 
One of their first tasks in this respect was to break up the traditional clientelist ties that 
community leaders had established in all neighbourhoods and instigate open deliberation and 
voting (Abers, 2000). They were also present to reduce the typical risk of powerful actors who 
sought to usurpate the participatory space and dominate the public debate (see Gurza Lavalle, 
Acharya and Houtzager, 2005). In general, plurality and less-powerful groups were respected 
and manipulation minimised, not in the least by the efforts of CCs who steered the process and 
prevented powerful minority groups to dominate. The technical expertise about infrastructure 
works was often not shared by the incumbent officials, despite the requirements for information 
sharing and the requests of citizen representatives for more transparency (Baierle, 2002). The 
CCs solved this problem and used their unique position in the bureaucracy to inform inhabitants 
about departmental procedures related to the infrastructure works in the neighbourhood. CCs 
also translated bureaucratic and technical slang into a language understandable for people who 
often were illiterate. 
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5.  An institutionalised state-society synergy
State-society relationship during the PT era in Porto Alegre could be characterised as ‘a 
mutual relative autonomy’ for both the administration and the citizens emphasising the sovereignty 
of the municipal executive branch and a decisive role of the central budget council COP (Santos 
de Sousa, 1998). This model proved to be an instrument to fine-tune the power balance between 
state authorities and citizens, respecting each other’s autonomy and remaining mutually 
interdependent. For this purpose it created municipal agencies and forums manned by the CCs 
to facilitate dialogue and mediation between the municipal administration and ordinary citizens. 
These liaison officers operated between municipal institutions and civil society, but also at the 
interdepartmental level inside the municipal administration. This newly created administrative 
structure was one of the most successful institutional innovations of the PT administration in 
Porto Alegre and this new administrative structure consisted of two basic layers.
The first layer of communication agencies consisted of the mayor’s cabinet and two pivotal 
departments which had the operational control of the annual participatory cycle. The most powerful 
body was the planning cabinet (GAPLAN), which coordinated the technical work of the budget 
deliberation and calculated the economic appraisal of the popular demands. Planning advisers 
transformed citizens’ proposals into a bureaucratic format, collected information and requested 
technical studies, and coordinated the implementation of the approved projects between the 
different departments of the administration. GAPLAN had a particularly important role by deciding 
the agenda of the ‘thematic rounds’ and presenting investment proposals6. The second important 
administrative office of the mayoralty was the department of Community Relations Coordination 
(CRC) consisting of 21 coordinators (one for each of the 16 city district and for each of the six 
thematic forums). The CRC was a crucial mediating agency linking the municipal government 
with the community leaders and their associations. Its collaborators functioned as facilitators 
for the practical organisation of the popular assemblies and the mobilisation of community 
organisations in each district. These CRC collaborators were the most communicative and 
enthusiastic proponents of the participatory scheme and their strength lied in their knowledge 
and familiarity with the issues that concerned people in each neighbourhood7. They had been 
recruited from the community organisations with whom they were now collaborating and assisting 
them in articulating their demands (Genro and Souza, 1997; Sousa Santos, 1998). 
6  Interview with Ubiritan de Souza, Coordinator of GAPLAN 1989-2001.
7  The members of the CRC were denominated by their respective acronyms: CROPs for the coordinators of the 16 
regional city districts and CTs for the coordinators of the six thematic forums.
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A second layer of coordinators facilitated an administrative restructuring and horizontal 
decision-making at departmental level to smoothen out the internal administrative process. 
These coordinators were crucial for the increased effectiveness and integrated planning inside 
the municipal bureaucracy itself, making it capable of responding towards citizens’ demands. 
First, planning advisors inside the line departments (the so-called ASSEPLAS) discussed the 
technical and administrative proceedings to elaborate the budget and the required projects 
inside each department and coordinated between different departments by collecting information 
and requesting technical studies. Secondly, community advisors of each department tried to 
intermediate between bureaucratic planning and demands from the communities en met regularly 
in a committee called FASCOM to harmonise the policies of the different departments and level 
out differences. 
The central role of the above mentioned coordinating agencies grafted upon the old 
departmental structure gave these new agencies both increasing power and prestige inside the 
municipal bureaucracy transforming them in super entities that operationalised the municipal 
budget and coordinated the project implementation. The new structure resulted in an increased 
level of efficiency and effectiveness of the municipal initiatives and more dialogue and consensus-
building toward civil society. It was, in our opinion, particularly through these agencies and 
forums manned with dedicated and convinced CCs that the participatory budget in Porto Alegre 
was innovative and exemplary in establishing genuine participation despite a traditional and rigid 
bureaucracy which the PT did not manage to dismantle. 
6.  The mayor and his staff firmly in control
Officially all budget decisions were approved by the central budget council COP, but in 
practice, the administration had significant influence due to its monopoly on technical information 
and the highly skilled professionals who were nearly always capable of formulating convincing 
arguments. CCs had an important role in steering the participatory process with the help of 
two important procedural mechanisms. Firstly, the municipality changed investment projects, in 
collaboration with the COP, on the basis of technical or financial considerations. It enabled the 
municipality to overrule any particular outcome of the participatory process and cancel demands 
which were technically non-viable, to give priority to investment projects of public interest, or 
to impose a logical order in infrastructural investments. Secondly, the municipal administration 
computed two objective variables which co-determined the distribution of the budget resources 
together with the priority votes of the citizens. These two variables, measuring the lack of existing 
infrastructure and the number of inhabitants in a given region, enabled the administration to 
prioritise projects in regions which were densely populated and with little infrastructure at the 
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expense of the projects in better-off regions. Consequently, citizens and the executive branch 
decided together the ranking of the investment projects according to a number of criteria set by 
the local administration.
The participatory budget was above all a successful political instrument for the PT that 
embodied the interaction with citizens and which enabled the party to create a joint spirit and 
identity about Porto Alegre as the capital of democratic citizenship8. The consecutive PT mayors 
made the participatory budget the hallmark of their municipal administration and underlined it 
with congresses, brochures, and hosting the international gathering of the ‘World Social Forum’. 
It created a reputation for Porto Alegre as a worldwide, unique democratic and participatory 
city with one of the highest living standards in Brazil. Many citizens considered themselves 
as privileged to be directly part of the annual display of popular participation, improvement of 
the city infrastructure, and social inclusion. During many years it resulted in an emotional and 
affective relationship between a majority of the citizens, and the consecutive PT mayors and 
their cabinets. In this new political atmosphere civic protests were replaced by negotiations, 
while confrontations against the municipal authorities shifted towards internal conflicts between 
different city districts and civic groups about priorities. The PT was able to expand this broad 
collaboration with civic groups during three consecutive mandates, until voters experienced a 
decline in the city’s infrastructure and municipal services after 2001. 
The CCs were also key figures in guaranteeing communication and collaboration between 
citizens. They dedicated especial attention to the elected citizen representatives (conselheiros 
in the COP and delegados of the regional assemblies) and prior to voting rounds they organised 
‘participatory caravans’, joint bus tours during which citizen representatives visited each other 
neighbourhood, which was often the first time they saw each other neighbourhoods. The goal 
was to let councillors see for themselves the (worse) situation in fellow regions and realise the 
tremendous difficulty of the administration to satisfy everybody’s needs. This particular strategy 
was successful in suppressing the inherent parochialism under neighbourhood representatives 
and substituted it with strategic cooperation and increased levels of solidarity which resulted 
almost always in a consensus about the allocation of projects to the most needed city region. 
In that respect, social learning did take place and permeated the whole participatory scheme in 
Porto Alegre (see also Abers, 2000). Afterwards, the councillors had to justify their choice and 
explain their voters in their own neighbourhood why the investment money was not coming their 
way, but was destined to another neighbourhood in a more precarious situation. It depended 
8  “Porto Alegre, Port of Citizenship” was a slogan in 1997 during the mayoralty of Tarso Genro.
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on their persuasive talent to survive these critical meetings and the CCs considered this as a 
decisive test to identify suitable community leaders9.
This policy-centred analysis shows an active and paramount role of the mayor and the 
militant CCs in the executive branch. This focus on actors inside the administration allows a more 
realistic view than the narrowly conceived conception of civil society theorists who envisage 
a self-regulated, horizontally-interlinked public sphere based on face-to-face deliberation and 
predominantly populated by social organisations claiming public goods. Yet the policy-centred 
analysis in this article doesn’t want to suggest that the emergence of a new public-private 
sphere in Porto Alegre was entirely provisional and exclusively politically managed. Such an 
interpretation would be the other extreme and would fail to recognise the complementary role of 
civil society movements and the emancipatory gain conferred on a group of marginalised people. 
Neighbourhood associations in Porto Alegre’s poorer districts were indeed actors of change who 
have altered the political culture in Porto Alegre for good. The best example of the durability of 
the process is the fact that the new mayorship dominated by opposition parties could not no 
longer forego the participatory budget scheme and incorporated it its administration in 2005. 
7.  Budget discipline and project implementation 
The success of any municipal administration depends largely on achieving tangible results 
within a reasonable period of time. In Latin America, politicians are renowned for not materialising 
the promises they make, but Porto Alegre’s participatory budget mainly tackled this problem by 
securing sufficient financial resources, prioritising infrastructure works, and implementing them 
as quick as possible. The participatory budget also fitted well in Brazil’s political tradition in which 
citizens are used to assess the legitimacy and efficiency of its governors and mayors by the 
number of infrastructure works carried out. 
Initially, budget discipline and implementation were the main pillars of the success of the PT 
administration in Porto Alegre. The municipal budget was enlarged by introducing the principle 
of progressivity for territorial taxes (IPTU)10, which resulted in a dramatic increase of the city’s 
revenues. It was the outcome of the party’s social agenda and its urge to redistribute taxes 
largely paid by rich and middle-class property owners to the city’s poorer districts in the form of 
increased public services. By 1990 municipal tax revenues were already forty percent higher 
than they had been in 1989 (Abers, 2000). The municipal government became also far more 
diligent in pursuing taxes owed to them. Another important financial windfall was a significant 
9  L. Armada de Souza, community consultant of the mayor’s cabinet 1993-1996.
10  IPTU: Imposto sobre a Propriedade Territorial Urbano.
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increase in the federal transfers due to the increased decentralisation. Consequently, the 
thorough administrative and fiscal reforms enabled an expansion of the city’s budget from US$ 
200 million in 1989 to more than US$ 500 million in 1998 which increased dramatically the 
municipality’s scope to initiate investments (Utzig, 1999). Especially during the first mandates the 
PT administrations paid much attention to the swift implementation of the investment projects. 
Innovative in this respect was the presence of mayors and directors of the departments in the 
main participatory assemblies in the city districts to give account for the allocation of the funds 
in the previous years .This ensured accountability and transparency and guaranteed that works 
were started and promises kept. 
Major problems occurred during the fourth mandate of the PT (2001-2004) when the 
municipal budget ran a structural deficit and the authorities were criticised for their slow-down 
in service delivery and lacking implementation. When the PT left office at the end of 2004, they 
left a serious budget deficit and 530 investment projects approved by the participatory council 
but not implemented. The unfinished projects represented R$ 60 million or almost double of 
the R$ 34 million investment budget of 200411. This was caused by financial drawbacks such 
as lower tax incomes and lower federal transfers. The double whammy was that expenses 
also rose due to accumulating overhead costs from previous investments in new schools, 
kindergartens, and medical centres. The latter setback may suggest that the participatory 
scheme became, in a sense, victim of its own success and partially collapsed under the financial 
weight of the additional services it had created. However, it would be too simple to explain the 
decline of the participatory scheme due to contingent budget factors and oversize. In the next 
paragraph it becomes clear that the participatory scheme showed two serious structural defects 
– bureaucratisation and professionalisation – which gradually compounded the city’s financial 
squeeze and the implementation delay and resulted in civic discontent and a defeat of the PT in 
the 2004 municipal elections. 
8.  Bureaucratisation and Professionalization of the Scheme
A first structural flaw of the participatory scheme can be linked to the nature of a participatory 
budget which in essence is an annual round of meetings during which citizens gather to vote 
for ‘a wish list’ of municipal investments. The annual scheme of popular deliberations was fixed 
and generated each year a list of new demands for more municipal expenses. This put large 
psychological pressure on the authorities to let the annual budget cycle take place, even though 
the city ran into a financial crisis after 2001. Moreover, the participatory budget was the flagship 
11  Zero Hora newspaper, 21 February 2005.
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of the municipal administration and suspending its annual functioning would have implied a 
confirmation of the criticism of the opposition parties and would have triggered the electoral 
defeat. In that sense the annual cycle of the participatory budget became the unassailable 
dogma of the PT administration12. Thus, the last PT mayor João Verle did not put on hold the 
wish list of citizens’ demands, adding more investment projects to a growing list of unfinished 
works which compounded the problems. 
A second pitfall of the participatory scheme is related to Michels’ iron law of oligarchy and the 
typical problem that each instrument of direct democracy has to solve: organizing widely divergent 
and multiple demands into a workable format of public management that shows concrete results, 
satisfies citizens, and serves the public interest13. In Porto Alegre this resulted, inevitably, in 
a process of ‘bureaucratisation’ of the participatory scheme which was initially conceived as 
an informal, horizontal, and direct instrument to implement popular demands14. In practice, it 
required an increasingly complex organisation to involve thousands of people in the participatory 
meetings and translating citizens’ demands into feasible investment projects. Additionally, the 
participatory scheme became alienated from the initial idea of an open and direct deliberation 
between ordinary citizens. Instead of opening up toward more interlocutors such as religious 
organisations and environmental movements, the scheme narrowed its scope to a reduced 
number of community leaders approached by the CCs in the poor neighbourhoods15. By the 
end of the PT administration, the procedure of the participatory budget was marked by delayed 
projects, complex internal rules for project selection and elections, counting more than sixty 
pages full of jargonic acronyms (Navarro, 2003). 
Gradually, the mutual deliberation between officials and the public about administrative 
and technical criteria, considered the strength of the model, became a burden for the fluidity of 
the process. There were increasingly conflicts and complaints of COP members about lacking 
information sharing by the administration, the need for expansion of the list of competence of the 
COP, and allegations of agenda setting by the administration. These discussions slowed down 
the deliberation of projects and resulted in hurried meetings, unfinished proposals, and makeshift 
projects in order to follow the rigid timetable imposed by the participatory scheme. Gradually the 
collective spirit of the participatory scheme was lost and the locus of decision shifted from the 
12  Carlos Todeschini, director DMAE.
13  The ‘iron law of oligarchy’ formulated by R. Michels (1915) states that all forms of organisation will eventually de-
velop into oligarchies due to leadership and delegation leading to specialisation, bureaucratisation, and alienation.
14  The Participatory Budget scheme was never enacted in a law or decree and the informal character of the PB was 
deliberately maintained in order to avoid legal and judicial procedures from political opponents who allegedly wanted 
to sabotage the scheme. 
15  Roque Stefen, community consultant DMAE and SMOV.
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collective assembly meetings in the neighbourhoods toward the municipal officials in the city 
hall16. 
This bureaucratisation of the participatory procedure went hand in hand with the second 
structural problem of the professionalization of the councillors of the COP. A group of experienced 
civic delegates became insiders who knew the complexity of the rules and managed to be 
continuously re-elected and, consequently, were able to build an (unpaid) career in the participatory 
budget scheme17. This professionalization had the advantage that these old stagers accumulated 
skills and technical knowledge to decide complex infrastructural investment projects. They also 
became experts in understanding the increasingly complex procedure of the participatory budget 
and kept it operational during many years. The downside was that the democratic principle of 
rotation of mandates was damaged and the distance between the delegates and the grassroots 
level gradually enlarged. Consequently, the COP became a parallel political force very similar 
to the much criticised city council. There were allegations that some COP councillors formed a 
closed club, referred to as a panelinha dos conselheiros18, eager to obtain their re-election and 
exchanging between them votes to favour each other investment projects. There has never 
surfaced evidence of malpractice or open clientelism of these COP councillors, but the reality in 
2004 was far away from the initial situation in 1990 of open and horizontal participation in which 
a majority of ordinary citizens decided the list of investment projects. 
9.  The Demise of the Participatory Scheme
9.1 Citizens’ disenchantment
The original format of the participatory budget came to an end when the PT coalition lost 
its absolute majority in the municipal elections of 2004. The defeat was evidently caused by 
a number of particular and single reasons such as voters’ fatigue after 16 years in power, a 
combination of political errors and misjudgements at the local level, and the failure of President 
Lula da Silva at the federal level to live up to the high expectations of the PT voters. Yet, the 
previous sections proved that there were also structural problems that precipitated the electoral 
16 A.P. Motta Costa, director of the department of social assistance FASC.
17 The internal rule of the PB limited in principal the mandate of a COP councillor to two consecutive terms, but a 
number of loopholes (e.g. no limitation to being a substitute councillor) enabled eager councillors to be re-elected 
continuously. Councillors who had two or more mandates represented half of the total and some of them were con-
selheiros during the entire 14 years that the PB functioned (Jorge Maciel, coordinator of the community consultants 
of DMAE). 
18 The word ‘panelinha’ is a derogatory term in Brazil for secretive clubs defending their own interests without transpar-
ency and often associated with corruption and malpractice (César Beras, community consultant DMAE).
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loss of the PT – especially the increased bureaucracy and the alienation of citizen delegates who 
were co-opted by the participatory structure.
The fact that the problems with the participatory scheme had an influence on the electoral 
defeat is not surprising because the participatory budget was the political instrument par excellence 
of the PT party and the main reference point for voters when evaluating the party’s performance 
at the municipal level. Subsequently, during the election campaign in 2004 the opposition 
parties used the weak points of the participatory budget such as the over-bureaucratisation and 
successfully exposed the delays of the promised projects, the lack of performance concerning 
health care and housing, and the budget deficit which paralysed the last PT administration. 
9.2 Civil servants’ disgruntlement
The support of the rank-and-file civil servants for the popular participation experiment eroded 
gradually and reached its lowest point during the PT’s last mandate from 2000-2004. A first 
reason was related to the functioning of the participatory budget itself. Civil servants especially 
in technical departments complained that they had lost autonomy and that citizens had gradually 
obtained too much influence. These were the housing department (DEMHAB), public works 
(SMOV) and the one responsible for sewage (DMAE) and they were gradually staffed with the 
largest number of CCs who had eroded the power of the technicians (Bairros 2003). Because 
a pillar of the participatory system was discussion and consensus-building, the CCs often had 
to give in to obtain the agreement of all parties and avoid conflicts. Increasingly, the largest 
mobilisation of people and the most cunning community leaders were able to push through 
their projects in the participatory budget meetings. That became especially problematic in the 
municipal departments of education and health care that came under pressure when incomes 
declined. During the election campaign in 2004, the opposition parties successfully used the 
argument that the standard of quality of health care centres and the municipal schools in Porto 
Alegre had gradually deteriorated with the PT being longer in office. 
A second reason for the drain of civil servants’ support was the end of the generous wage 
policy that included a two-monthly inflation adjustment for all municipal officials’ salaries 
(bimestralidade) which was unique in Brazil. The PT had temporarily placate the opposition of 
the rank-and-file civil servants (funcionarios de carreira) by paying them more, but the increasing 
salaries resulted in mounting costs which became unbearable once the municipality was 
confronted with lower incomes. In 2003 the mayor had to suspend the bimestralidade, causing 
disgruntlement from the affected civil servants. Notwithstanding the difficulties, the executive 
branch kept such a strong belief in the magic of the BP formula and in 2003 it launched a special 
participatory budgeting round for civil servants in order to regain their support. It was called the 
‘orçamento participativo interno’ (internal participatory budget) and obliged civil servants to go 
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through lengthy meetings to list their priorities even for the allocation of simple stationery. The 
internal participatory budget was a fiasco and was an indication that the PT executive branch 
considered the model of the participatory budget a panacea for allocating public resources.
When the budget process gradually became more complex and the departments were 
no longer able to exert a swift implementation of the projects the mayor’s cabinet reacted by 
contracting more CCs, resulting in an exponentially growth of their numbers19. At that stage the 
new clientelism had already rooted inside the participatory structure and this resulted in rewarding 
loyal citizens with a job in the municipal administration. Consequently, these new recruits lacked 
the skills of the CCs of the first hour and could no longer speed up the cumbersome procedures of 
the participatory scheme and grease the municipal administration due to the growing obstruction 
from disgruntled rank-and-file civil servants20.
10. Conclusion
The Workers Party with a clear commitment to redistribute public investments and prioritise 
poorer neighbourhoods created the ideological opening for a successful municipal administration 
in Porto Alegre. A new tax policy enlarged the budget which allowed for new investments and 
militant activists appointed as officials inside the administration contributed to a balanced system 
of autonomy, accountability, and swift implementation. These institutional preconditions paved 
the way for a unique policy innovation in Porto Alegre. 
From a government perspective, the most spectacular innovation in Porto Alegre was 
the grafting of a participatory-minded administrative layer on the existing bureaucracy which 
was intrinsically against any system of citizens’ involvement. It required a special category of 
appointed officials – the so-called CCs – who operated as a crowbar to break the initial resistance 
and to become intermediaries between the executive branch and the population. The success of 
the participatory budget formula hinged on the performance of these co-opted militant partisan 
members who were appointed as street-level officials inside the local administration. They 
constituted the “linchpins” of the PT administration, boosting communication with civil society 
organisations with whom they were familiar and greasing the bureaucratic machinery due to 
their position inside the municipal departments. Their institutional engineering, supervising, and 
19  At the end of the PT administration in December 2004, there were almost 800 CCs appointed at crucial positions in 
the municipal administration, representing six percent of the total number of municipal civil servants. Their number 
had tripled between 1989 and 2004, while the number of regular civil servants had grown by thirty percent (Secr. 
Municipal de Administração, 2001; Correio do Povo, 28 Jan. 2005).
20  L. Armada de Souza, community consultant of the mayor’s cabinet 1993-1996.
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fomenting of the popular meetings and deliberations kept on track the complex up to the final 
implementation stage. 
The problems of the participatory budget started to emerge during the PT’s third mandate 
and indicated the typical vulnerability of a participatory mechanism based on direct democracy. 
It was confronted with the problem of institutionalisation, bureaucratisation and co-optation 
resulting in alienation, delays and cumbersome procedures. Little by little the revolutionary idea 
of 1989 became a parallel bureaucratic system in which ‘professional’ participants hold sway 
and became alienated from the daily reality in the neighbourhoods. The city’s financial deficit 
triggered the collapse of deliberation principle and the project implementation during the fourth 
mandate. Even the successful involvement of the CCs of the first hour lost its momentum with 
the emergence of a partisan clientelism that resulted in the influx of incompetent CCs in the 
administration.
This policy-centred analysis wants to point at the need for the bureaucratic embeddedness 
of participatory instruments. Local politics and officials are crucial in the creation and the success 
of participatory mechanisms and municipal authorities must have control to let it succeed. The 
need for a strong and dedicated political leadership and street-level officials to steer the process, 
sufficient financial resources linked to swift project implementation, and interested and motivated 
citizens are necessary preconditions All these requirements need to be present to guarantee 
a constant success of the participatory process and the absence of one of them limit both the 
duplicability and the durability of any participatory budgeting scheme. The PT achieved to 
combine all these preconditions during the three first mandates and especially during the second 
mayorship of Tarso Genro (1993-1996) when the participatory budget reached its highest peak. 
The decline of the scheme and its collapse during the last PT mandate warns for too much 
optimism and misrepresenting the participatory budget as the ultimate panacea for solving all the 
evils of top-down and non-accountable administrations. 
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